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Abstract
A large literature has documented top income share series based on income
tax statistics using the common methodology established by Piketty (2001,
2003). The disappearance of capital income from the income tax base in
many countries poses a major challenge to the comparability of these series
both over time and between countries. First, we extend the existing German
series including capital gains to 2010, and the series excluding capital gains
to 2008. Second, we derive three homogeneous series by simulating legislative
definitions of capital income prevailing in Germany between 2001 and 2010.
For both simulation and the exclusion of capital gains, we employ a rich
data set containing the tax files of all income taxpayers. Third, we construct
a composite measure of stock dividends and interest income tax flows as a
proxy for capital income missing in the data since 2009. We find that the
drop in top income shares obtained from income tax statistics in the crisis
year 2009 is largely attributable to the exclusion of capital income from the
income tax base.
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1 Introduction
Personal income tax data have proven to be an invaluable data source for the long-
run development of income concentration. Many countries introduced a modern
income tax over a 100 years ago. These series on top income shares can be used
to analyze the dynamics and driving forces of income concentration over time and
across countries. Over the past decades, income concentration increased in many in-
dustrialized countries. The increase began earlier and is higher in English-speaking
countries like the UK and the US than in continental European countries like Ger-
many and France.
The World Top Income Database (WTID) contains long-run top income share
series for 26 countries using a common methodology and a common data base, i.e.,
personal income tax statistics (Alvaredo et al., 2014). Many of the results have been
published in two collective volumes (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007, 2010). However,
income tax data suffer the drawback that the definition of taxable income and,
hence, the share of income documented in tax data changes with reforms over time.
Much effort has been put into the methodological harmonization of the computation
of top income shares (see, e. g., Atkinson, 2007).
In particular, the disappearance of capital income from the income tax base
in many countries poses a major challenge to the comparability of top income share
series both over time and between countries.1 Capital income such as interest in-
come, dividends or returns on pension funds is now taxed separately from the PIT
by flat rates or is fully tax exempt. Since capital income is largely concentrated
among top income taxpayers, top income shares assessed on PIT statistics most
likely underestimate income concentration at the top.
In Germany, the introduction of a final withholding tax on capital income and
the consequential exclusion of capital income from the income tax base coincides
with the highest output drop of the post-war era. German GDP decreased by 5.1 %
in 2009. Consequently, it is unclear whether the drop in top income shares is due
1Nordic countries introduced dual income taxation in the 1990s, other European countries such
as Austria and the Netherlands followed. In Germany, a final withholding tax on capital income
was introduced in 2009.
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to the crisis or due to changes in the tax base definition.
Following the great recession, top income shares fell in most countries in 2008–
2009, indicating that the first-round effect of the crisis disproportionately hit the top
of the income distribution. These drops do not necessarily change the evolution of
income concentration in the long run: Piketty and Saez (2013) discuss the recession’s
impact on top income shares and conclude that economic downturns do not seem
to have long-run effects on inequality, but rather regulatory changes such as tax
reforms. Long-run analyses of top income shares have come to similar conclusions
when analyzing earlier recessions. Theoretical analyses provide strong arguments
for the power of institutions such as tax progression as opposed to one-time events
(Piketty, 2003, 2007, Piketty and Saez, 2003, 2007).
This paper addresses two challenges. We analyze to which extent top income
shares based on tax data underestimate income concentration when capital income
is missing in the data. Our second aim is to disentangle the impact of the recession
and the tax reform in Germany. We estimate German top income series from 2001
to 2010 using the most recently available income tax data. We thereby extend the
existing series with capital gains provided by Dell (2007, 2011) from 2007 to 2010
and the series without capital gains provided by Dell (2007) from 1998 up to 2008.
For the exclusion of capital gains we exploit a rich dataset that includes individual
tax returns of all taxpayers.
We simulate three top income share series, each applying one of the three
taxable income definitions prevailing between 2001 and 2010. Income tax microdata
allow us to vary the fraction of capital income included in the overall taxable income.
We thereby can check the sensitivity of German top income shares to the gradual
disappearance of capital incomes from the income tax base. Furthermore, as the
data since 2009 have lacked information about the magnitude of personal capital
income and its distribution, we develop an approach how to add missing capital
income to the essentially non-capital income share series assessed on the tabulated
income tax statistics since 2009. We check several proxies for capital income, such
as tax flow aggregates, national accounts, stock dividends and survey data.
Our main findings are as follows. First, excluding taxable capital gains reduces
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top income shares only by little. Second, we find that the drop of top income shares
in the crisis year 2009 is largely attributable to the disappearance of capital income
from the underlying data. The recession seems to have had a minor impact on
the top of the German income distribution. Third, a composite measure of stock
dividends and interest income tax flows turns out to be a suitable proxy for capital
income missing in the tax data since 2009. Fourth, including imputed capital income
increases top income shares by between 6 % for the top decile and almost 30 % for
the top 0.01 % in 2009 and 2010.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview over the
data used and the methodology employed to arrive at top income share estimates.
We briefly describe data sources for potential proxies of capital income. Section 3
starts with the trends in top income shares with and without capital income when
using the raw income tax data. In section 4, we then turn to check the sensitivity
of the top income series to legislative changes in the definition of capital income by
simulating three different series. In section 5, we discuss proxies for missing capital
income. Last, we present top income series including capital income up to 2010.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Methodology
In the following, we provide a brief description of both data and methodology for the
estimation of top income shares. More details on the employed data can be found in
Appendix C. For the estimation of top income shares we use both tabulated income
tax statistics available annually since 2001 for the years 2001-2010 (PIT statistics)
and a very rich data set that includes the tax returns of all income taxpayers available
for the years 2001-2008 (PIT microdata). Both data are provided by the German
federal statistical office (Destatis). In the search of a proxy for missing capital
income, we draw on additional data sources such as national accounts, tax flow
statistics and stock market indices.
PIT statistics give the number of tax units and reported income by income
bracket and provide the basis for our top income share series including capital gains.
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These data were also used by Dell (2011) for the last update of the German series in
the WTID.2 Reported income is taxable income after income source specific deduc-
tions, but before personal allowances which we will refer to as gross taxable income
(GTI) (Gesamtbetrag der Einku¨nfte).
Using PIT statistics, we apply the Pareto interpolation method commonly used
in the top income share literature since the seminal contribution of Piketty (2001,
2003) to obtain thresholds and average incomes of top income groups for each year.
Top income shares result from dividing the cumulative income above the income
threshold of a fractile by an external total income. As there are tax units who do
not file an income tax return, tax statistics neither comprise the whole population,
nor do they include total income. In order to derive top income shares we therefore
need external totals for both population and income. In the German PIT, tax units
are either married couples or bachelors. As population total, we therefore use the
sum of married couples and bachelors published in population statistics of Destatis.
Following Dell (2007) we define adults as those aged 20 and above. The population
total for 1998-2010 is reported in Table A.1. We also follow Dell (2007) for the
construction of the income total and use 90 % of total primary household income
less employers’ social security contributions as published in national accounts. The
income total construction is described in Appendix A. The control for total income
for 1998-2010 is reported in Table A.2.
PIT statistics suffer two drawbacks of substantial importance for our research
question: First, taxable capital gains are not reported separately. Series excluding
capital gains can thus not be derived. Second, PIT statistics only report the taxable
income after income source specific deductions and are thus sensitive to changes
in the definition of taxable income. For the estimation of top income shares, this
is of particular importance regarding capital income: the share of capital income
reported in German PIT statistics in two stages declined to zero as a result of tax
2Annual tax statistics do not include tax units who only paid payroll tax and did not file
an income tax return. This is, however, of limited importance for the estimation of top income
shares. As long as a tax unit receives other income than wages above certain thresholds, filing an
income tax return is mandatory. In addition, even when wages are the only income source, filing
a tax return is favorable for most high-income tax units. E.g., even though 31.9 % of total income
taxpayers do not file a return paying only payroll tax in 2007, this share drops to 3.7 % in the top
decile.
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reforms in 2002 and 2009.
PIT microdata comprise the full sample of all income taxpayers’ tax returns.
For each taxpayer, we have information on capital income and capital gains. Until
2008, PIT microdata include information on both full dividends and interest income
before source-specific deductions. We are thus able to compute shares including
and excluding capital gains. Furthermore, we can derive top income series homoge-
neously over time based on varying definitions of capital income and, thereby, check
the sensitivity of top income shares to the gradual erosion of capital income in the
PIT tax base. Using PIT microdata, we can directly sort taxpayers by fractiles, so
we do not need an interpolation method. Top income shares are derived using the
same population and income totals as the interpolated shares from PIT statistics
described above.3
Since 2009 we completely lack information on the capital income total and its
distribution among top income individuals. We therefore have to impute capital
income by fractile based on external capital income totals. Any suitable proxy of
capital income of private households would have to correlate strongly with capital
income in PIT microdata. For the years 2001 to 2008, we can test the correlation of
external data sources with capital income in the PIT. Four indicators might provide
proxies for capital income on the household level: Household sector capital income
from national accounts, tax flow statistics on dividends and interest income, stock
market indices, and capital income observed in the German survey data SOEP. We
compute correlations between the capital income total in PIT and capital income
by fractile with these external sources. Each of these sources bears particular ad-
vantages and disadvantages on which we elaborate in the following. Appendix C
provides additional information on the employed data sources.
• National accounts of dividends and interest income comprise the most compre-
hensive concept of capital income in the household sector. National accounts
aggregates exceed PIT aggregates because the household sector is based on a
broader definition than the number of personal income taxpayers and the defini-
3For top income shares excluding capital gains, we correct the income control total for taxable
capital gains by substracting the sum of taxable capital gains observed in PIT microdata.
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tion of capital income itself is broader than the definition of capital income subject
to PIT. The household sector in national accounts includes unincorporated busi-
nesses if they are owned by a single person (as opposed to partnerships) as well as
private non-profit organizations. Capital income of the household sector includes
interest income and dividends that are not distributed but reinvested by private
insurances and pension funds. Moreover, dividends in national accounts com-
prise distributed profits of unincorporated businesses (partnerships), which are
classified as unincorporated business income or agricultural income in the PIT
and, thus, not part of taxable capital income in the PIT (Schwarz, 2008). Still,
gross dividends and interest income from national accounts might display enough
correlation to serve as a proxy for PIT capital income after 2008.
• Tax flow statistics report withheld tax flows on dividends from corporations and
interest income. Even though the final withholding tax on capital income was
not introduced before 2009, 2008 there already existed a withholding pre-tax on
dividends and interest income counting against both PIT and corporation tax
liability by the end of the year. Tax flows are reported separately for dividends
and interest income. The tax base generating these tax flows can be calculated
by dividing the tax flows by the respective tax rates. However, tax flow statistics
suffer three drawbacks: First, their aggregate depends on the level of the saver’s
allowance which varied greatly between 2000 and 2010 (see Appendix Figure E.4).
Second, aggregates include interest and dividends received by corporations and
unincorporated businesses. Third, the tax base definitions for both dividends and
interest income changed by legislative reforms likewise the PIT statistics. Between
2002 and 2008, only half of the dividends received by households formed the tax
base to the tax, while the full cash dividend became taxable in 2009. The tax base
for interest income includes capital gains from stock shares since 2009. This effect,
however, is expected to be small in 2009, as transitional rules are quite generous.
In consequence to these changes, it is not clear whether the correlations between
the tax flow statistics’ tax bases and personal capital income in PIT microdata
between 2001 and 2008 are comparable to the years since 2009.
• Aggregated dividends from German stock companies can be derived using the
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most comprehensive German stock index (CDAX). Neither do all dividends in
this aggregate flow to the household sector, nor are the recipients necessarily Ger-
man taxpayers. In addition, dividends from closely held corporations are not
included in the aggregate. However, its time series reflects the expected divi-
dend development of private stock market portfolios and might therefore display
a similar trend as private dividend income.
• The SOEP is a representative panel study containing individual and household
data in Germany from 1984 onwards and was expanded to the New German Laen-
der after German reunification in 1990. All household members are interviewed
individually once they reach the age of 16. SOEP reports gross household income
by component including the sum of dividend and interest income. Like most pop-
ulation surveys, SOEP lacks information on individuals at the top of the income
distribution. In general, households up to the top 1 % are well represented. 4 We
use capital income from the top 5 % without the top 1 % of households (P95-99),
applying the fractile thresholds for the 95th and the 99th percentile obtained from
PIT microdata.
3 Top Income Shares, 2001–2010
Over the last two decades income concentration at the top increased substantially
in Germany. Figure 1 reports series both excluding and including capital gains since
World War II for the top 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %. After a quite stable development since
the 1960s, the year 1995 seems to mark a turning point.5 The share of the richest
decile increased from 32 % in 1995 to 38 % 2010 by almost 20 %. The share of the
richest percentile increased from 9 % in 1995 to 12 % 2010 by almost 30 %. Despite a
short period of modest decrease in the beginning of the 2000s, income concentration
at the top never returned to the low post-war levels. Contrasting the series with
and without capital gains reveals that realized taxable capital gains are of minor
4Appendix Figure E.5 shows that top income shares based on SOEP using thresholds from PIT
statistics reveal quite the same level as shares based on PIT statistics, even though the difference
increases moving further to the top.
5See Dell (2007) for an extensive discussion of the long-run development of top income shares
in Germany from 1891 to 1998.
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importance up to the richest percentile. One should keep in mind, however, that
realized capital gains were mostly not taxable in Germany during this time and thus
not part of the underlying income concept of the series.6

































Top 10% incl. CG Top 5% incl. CG Top 1% incl. CG
Top 10% excl. CG Top 5% excl. CG Top 1% excl. CG
Source: PIT statistics and PIT microdata, WTID for 1950-1998 and own calculations since 2001.
Note: Ranking including and excluding capital gains, respectively.
Figure 2 turns to the development of the very rich, i.e., the top 0.1 % and
top 0.01 %. Income shares accruing to these groups did return to levels of 1995 in
the early 2000s, but steeply and steadily increased ever since. Between 2003 and
2008, the share of the top 0.1 % increased from 3,7 % to 5,3 % by more than 40 %.
Excluding capital gains has a larger effect for the very top in both stabilizing the
series over time and reducing their income share. However, excluding capital gains
6E.g., capital gains from stock shares and real estate were tax-exempt to a large part. See
Appendix D.2 for details on German capital gains taxation and changes therein over our data
period. In general, the German share of capital gains in total taxable income is low compared to
other countries such as Sweden or the US (Roine and Waldenstro¨m, 2012). The impact of capital
gains is somewhat higher if they are defined before income source-specific deductions (Bach et al.,
2013). Even though the taxable share of capital gains is low in Germany, their importance for
top incomes can be high: Roine and Waldenstro¨m (2012) show that in Sweden, capital gains are
a substantial and reoccuring addition to top incomes, rather than a transitory component.
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does not change the trend of increasing income concentration.

































Top 0.1% incl. CG Top 0.01% incl. CG
Top 0.1% excl. CG Top 0.01% excl. CG
Source: PIT statistics and PIT microdata, WTID for 1950-1998 and own calculations since 2001.
Note: Ranking including and excluding capital gains, respectively.
There are two developments one should be aware of when interpreting the
observed trends in Figures 1 and 2. First, several tax reforms are likely to have
induced income timing. Second, changes in the definition of taxable income reduced
top income shares mechanically.
Reforms in capital income taxation and changes in the top marginal PIT tax
rate may have triggered income timing. Changes in capital income taxation are
likely to have impacted on capital income realization in 2001, 2008 and 2009: 2001
was the last year where the corporation tax could be fully credited against the PIT.
Hence, 2001 was marked by an all-time high in dividend distribution which boosted
capital income in 2001 in comparison to the following years. Dividend income from
closely held corporations in 2009 may have been preponed to 2008.7 In turn, interest
7In 2008, the tax rate on corporate gains distributed in the same year was exceptionally low
due to the introduction of the final withholding tax on capital income in 2009. Therefore, dividend
distribution of some corporations was preponed. See Appendix D.3 for details on the withholding
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income may have been postponed to 2009, as the marginal top tax rate on interest
income was reduced from 45 % in the PIT to 25 % in the final withholding tax in
2009.
The marginal top PIT tax rate changed frequently between 2001 and 2008:
between 2000 and 2005, the top marginal tax rate was gradually reduced from 51 %
in 2000 to 48.5 % in 2001, to 45 % in 2004, and reached its low of 42 % in 2005.
As the gradual reduction up to 2005 had been anticipated since the year 2000, we
expect some income shifting from the earlier years to 2005 and later years. If top
incomes react more elastic to taxation than incomes at lower levels, this shifting may
have increased top income shares. Hence, the tax reform might have contributed to
the subsequent increase in top income shares between 2004 and 2008. However, top
income shares continued to increase in 2007 and 2008, when the top tax rate was
raised to 45 % again, suggesting that income timing is not the driving force behind
the increase in top income shares.8
Both reforms mechanically reduced the income share accruing to the top where
capital income is concentrated by changing the definition of capital income. In 2002,
the taxable share of dividends in the PIT decreased by 62.5 %. In 2009, dividend
and interest income was completely excluded from the PIT tax base due to the
introduction of a final withholding tax on capital income.
The reduced share of dividend income in GTI may explain some of the decrease
in top income shares after 2001. In 2009, when capital income was entirely excluded
from the PIT, all fractiles experienced large losses. However, the mechanical effect
of the exclusion of capital income coincides with the largest output drop of the post-
war era. In 2009, German GDP decreased by 5.1 %. From 2008 to 2009, the share of
the top percentile went down by 13 % and the share of the top 0.1 % even by 25 %.
In the wake of economic recovery in 2010, top income shares slightly increased. In
tax reform.
8The increase in the top tax rate only applied to incomes above 250,000 e. Income shifting to
2007 and 2008 years is still plausible because of two other legislative changes regarding income from
unincorporated businesses and dividend income: For unincorporated business income, the lower
top tax rate persisted until 2007. In 2008, dividends may have been preponed, which might have
overcompensated reactions to the increased top tax rate. (See Footnote 7 above and Appendix
D.3 for details.) However, our harmonized series show that top income shares excluding capital
income only slightly decrease in 2008 (see Section 4 and Appendix Table B.5 (scenario 3).
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the following sections, we will focus on the second of the two developments discussed
above: the mechanical effect of the gradual exclusion of capital income from the PIT
tax base. The question of the magnitude of income timing is beyond the scope of this
paper. While section 4 will focus on the impact of changes in taxable capital income
until 2008, section 5 turns to the impact of the reform of 2009 and the development
thereafter to disentangle crisis and tax reform effect.
4 The Role of Capital Income
Between 2001 and 2008 two tax reforms induced the gradual disappearance of capital
income from the income tax base. In the following, we first provide a brief overview
of the two reforms. Further, we provide details on the income composition of the
top fractiles with a particular emphasis on capital income when moving to the top
of the distribution. We then turn to check the sensitivity of the top income series
to the disappearance of capital income from the underlying data. We derive three
harmonized top income series based on varying income tax legislations: Scenario 1
corresponds to German tax legislation until 2001. Scenario 2 applies the legislation
in force between 2001 and 2008. Scenario 3 corresponds to the legislation since 2009.
Figure 3 indicates the timing of the two reforms within the picture of the raw
data top income shares basically zooming in into the development between 1998 and
2010 already presented in Figures 1 and 2.
Until 2001, capital income as the sum of dividends and interest income was fully
taxable in the PIT. Dividends were defined as gross dividends before corporation
tax. We refer to this legislation as the 100 %-rule. The first reform in 2002 changed
the definition of taxable dividends from full gross dividend (before corporation tax)
to half cash dividend (after corporation tax). We refer to this legislation as the 50 %-
rule. Even though the effective tax rate on gross dividends only slightly changed, the
share of taxable dividend income in gross taxable income was reduced by almost two
thirds (62.5 %). The second reform in 2009 introduced a final withholding tax on
capital income, which led to the complete exclusion of capital income from taxable
income. Consequently, PIT statistics do not have any information on capital income
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Figure 3: Top Income Shares in Germany, 1998-2010
Source: PIT statistics, own calculations. Note: Shares are including capital gains.
since 2009. Additionally, the ranking of individuals based on these statistics most
probably differs from the years before since the ranking is based on non-capital
income since then. We refer to this legislation as the 0 %-rule. Further details on
the three tax regimes are given in Appendix D.
Both reforms are expected to impact primarily at the top of the income dis-
tribution where capital income is concentrated. Figure 4 gives the composition of
taxable income within top fractiles. The bottom half of the top decile generates 90 %
of income through wages. For the next four percent the wage share drops to 80 %
and then continues to decrease quite sharply. The top 0.01 % has a wage share of
only 10 %. The role of self-employed9 income increases up to the 99.99th percentile
and then decreases towards the very top. Even though the importance of capital
income increases towards the top, it fails to generate the largest part of top incomes.
The very top accrues the bulk of their income through entrepreneurial income from
unincorporated businesses. With the gradual exclusion of capital income from the
tax base, the share of capital income of the top 0.01 % declines from almost 30 % in
2001 to about 10 % in 2004 and an 2007. The magnitude of this decline is reinforced
by exceptionally high dividend payments in 2001 and the introduction of the 50 %
9Self-employed income and unincorporated business income differ by the payment of the local
business tax. Some professions are excluded from its liability (mostly physicians and lawyers) and
their income is than classified as self-employed instead of business.
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Agriculture Business Self-Employment Wages
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2007
Source: FAST, PIT statistics (3-annual), own calculations.
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rule in 2002.
Three top income series under simulated tax regimes each based on a homo-
geneous capital income definition are presented in Figure 5. Scenario 1 shows top
income shares if capital income had fully entered taxable income (100 %-rule), as it
was the case before 2002. Scenario 2 shows top income shares applying the 50 %-rule.
Between 2002 and 2008, this series corresponds almost perfectly with the raw data
series.10 Scenario 3 shows top income shares if capital income had been excluded
from the PIT tax base already in the years prior to 2009 (0 %-rule).






































Top 5% Sc1 Top 1% Sc1 Top 0.1% Sc1
Top 5% Sc2 Top 1% Sc2 Top 0.1% Sc2
Top 5% Sc3 Top 1% Sc3 Top 0.1% Sc3
Source: PIT microdata until 2008, PIT statistics thereafter, own calculations. Note: Scenario 1
refers to pre 2001 rules (100 %-rule), Scenario 2 to 2001/02-2008 rules (50 %-rule) and Scenario 3 to
post 2008 rules (0 %-rule). Tax units are sorted according to the scenario-specific taxable income
definition. See Appendix Table B.5 for harmonized shares of scenarios 1–3.
The three scenarios allow us to draw two main conclusions. First, a significant
portion of the drop in top income shares in 2009 observed in Figure 3 using the raw
PIT statistics can be explained by the tax reform. Second, estimates of top income
shares would be both at a higher level and would have increased at a higher rate
between 2004 and 2008 if capital income had not vanished from PIT statistics.
The first conclusion is illustrated by scenario 3. If capital income was excluded
from the tax base throughout the entire period, top income shares would have de-
creased only slightly in 2009. Hence, the 2009 drop in raw data top income shares
can be explained by the withholding tax reform to some extent, but not entirely.
10Small differences are due to a transitional period that began already in 2001.
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The top 1 % share drops by 1.63 percentage points in raw-data shares, and by 0.83 in
scenario 3. I.e., the drop is only half of the size if capital income had been excluded
in 2008 already. The top 0.1 % share drops by 1.18 percentage points using raw PIT
statistics, and by 0.79 percentage points in scenario 3. Hence, the portion of the
2009 drop that can be explained by the exclusion of capital income from the PIT
tax base decreases towards the top and the relative size of the remaining drop in
scenario 3 increases towards the top: while the drop is below 2 % for the top 5 %, it
exceeds 7 % for the top 1 % and reaches almost 20 % for the top 0.1 %. From this,
we can draw the conclusion that the output drop in 2009 did disproportionately hit
the very top of the non-capital income distribution, albeit to a smaller degree than
raw data shares presented in Section 3 would suggest.
The second conclusion is illustrated by scenario 1 and scenario 2. If capital
income would have been subject to the 100 %-rule (scenario 1) instead of the 50 %-
rule (scenario 2), then estimated top income shares would be both at a higher level
and would increased at a higher rate between 2001 and 2008. Simulating the 100 %
rule instead of the 50 % rule raises the top 1 % share by more than 1.5 percentage
points, 1.2 of which accrue to the top 0.1 %. This indicates the heavy concentration
of dividend income at the very top. The share of the top percentile under the
actually prevailing rules of scenario 2 increased by about 24 % between 2004 and
2008, whereas their share increased by 30 % under the 100 %-rule of scenario 1.
In sum, harmonized series show that top income shares increased more than
raw data series suggest. Much of the decrease in top income shares between 2001 and
2003 is driven by the introduction of the 50 % rule. Top income shares excluding
capital income reveal that much of the 2009 drop in the raw data series can be
explained by the introduction of the 0 % rule. However, the series excluding capital
income still display a drop in 2009, whose size increases towards the very top.
5 A Proxy for Missing Capital Income
As capital income was completely excluded from the PIT in 2009, our harmonized
series including full capital incomes (scenario 1) ends in 2008 and cannot be extended
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without imputation of capital incomes at the top.11 In this section, we discuss several
proxies for capital income. Our goal is to obtain top income shares including capital
income for 2009 and 2010 extending the series of scenario 1.
In order to derive the best proxy for capital income, we test the correlation
between external capital income aggregates described in Section 2 and the capital
income reported in PIT microdata. As PIT microdata until 2008 display individ-
ual interest and dividend income separately, we can check the correlations between
external aggregates of both dividends and interest income.
The external aggregates for dividend and interest incomes are shown in Figure
6. Aggregated dividends from national accounts, tax flow statistics and the German
stock market (CDAX) are reported in the upper graph. Aggregated interest income
from national accounts and tax flow statistics is given in the lower graph. Addition-
ally, both graphs show the corresponding income aggregates from PIT microdata
between 2001 and 2008.
All dividend aggregates show a drop in 2009, albeit of very different magnitude.
The tax flow aggregate peaks in 2008 and displays a large drop by almost 50 % in
2009. This large change can be partly due to preponed dividend distribution in
2008 as discussed in Section 3. Stock market dividends also peak in 2008, but their
development is much smoother over the years. They decline in 2009 and 2010, and
slightly recover in 2011. National accounts dividends show a trend similar to stock
market dividends. In sum, the time trend of aggregated PIT dividends seems to
correspond closest with stock market dividends.12 However, trends slightly differ
in 2007 and 2008: PIT microdata display less dividend growth in 2007 and more
dividend growth in 2008. This could reflect the same reaction to the potentially low
tax rate in 2008 as described above for the tax flow aggregate.
The selected aggregates for interest income converged over the past two decades.
The higher level of national accounts interest income as compared to the tax flow
11The dualization of the income tax schedule does not necessarily lead to a lack of data on top
incomes: in Scandinavian countries, information on capital income and other income can be linked
using the individual taxpayer-ID. In Germany, data linkage by taxpayer is not available.
12Stock market dividends and dividends in PIT microdata also nearly coincide in levels – this
is, however, rather a coincidence as German stocks are not entirely owned by German private
households.
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aggregate in the 1990s might be due to the prevailing high savers’ allowance (see
Appendix Figure E.4) and the inclusion of reinvested interest income from private
pension insurances. The convergence could be explained by both the gradual broad-
ening of the tax base and the decrease of the savers’ allowance. The national ac-
counts aggregate peaks in 2008, followed by a pronounced drop in 2009, while the
tax flow aggregate peaks in 2009 and drops in 2010. To some extent, we expect
that taxable interest income was postponed to 2009, as the final withholding tax
substantially reduced the marginal tax rate on interest income for high-income tax
units.13 Both level and time trend of the tax flow aggregate largely coincide with
the PIT aggregate. The smaller growth rate of the PIT aggregate in 2007 and 2008
might be due to income timing. If interest income was postponed to 2009, the PIT
aggregate should reflect this timing effect more than the tax flow aggregate, which
partly includes interest income of corporations and of non-resident persons who were
not subject to an equally large tax rate reduction.
In sum, the time series reveal strong correlations between capital income ag-
gregates in PIT microdata and two external aggregates in particular: PIT dividends
follow German stock market dividends, while PIT interest income displays a similar
trend to the tax flow aggregate. For both income sources, trends differ from the
external totals’ trends in 2007 and 2008, which can most likely be explained by
taxable income reactions to tax law changes.
The selected proxy should not only correlate with the PIT aggregates of divi-
dends and interest income, but also with capital income of the top fractiles. To test
the correlation between proxies and certain fractiles’ aggregates, we need to decide
on which ranking these fractiles are based. We can either sort individuals according
to their income with capital income or without capital income. If we aim to extend
the 100 %-rule series, we would have to use the sorting according to income with cap-
ital income. However, we know that for 2009 and 2010 we can only observe the top
income shares without capital income, as the 0 %-rule has been applied since 2009.
Adding capital incomes corresponding to the 100 %-rule sorting to non-capital top
13A second explanation for the tax flow aggregate’s peak in 2009 could be the inclusion of capital
gains from stock shares in the tax base since 2009. Since the introduction of the withholding tax
in 2009, capital gains are part of the presented tax flow on interest income. However, as there were
generous transitional rules, we expect this impact to be small in 2009.
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National accounts Tax flow aggregate
PIT microdata
Source: Tax flow statistics, PIT microdata, stock market indices (CDAX), and German national
accounts (household sector). Note: Values are in 2010 prices.
income shares assessed on 0 %-rule sorting would overestimate top income shares.
We can therefore (i) correct the non-capital top income shares for the sorting effect,
which brings us the closest we can get to the 100 %-rule shares. Or we can (ii)
use 0 %-rule sorting observed in the raw data and add capital income shares to top
non-capital income shares, which would enable us to derive a consistent series since
2001. We choose the 0 %-rule sorting (ii) as our preferred imputation, since it can
be interpreted as a lower bound for top income shares and allows us to construct a
consistent series.
Table 1 shows correlations between external aggregates and PIT fractiles’ ag-
gregates indicating to which extent the correlation varies over top income fractiles.
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The upper part of Table 1 refers to dividends, while the lower part refers to inter-
est income. The first column gives the correlation of fractiles aggregate dividend
or interest income with the total observed in PIT microdata. The second to sixth
columns give the fractiles’ correlation with external aggregates. Additionally to the
afore presented aggregates, we include capital income from the SOEP survey and
GDP. For interest income, we include current GDP. For dividend income we include
lagged GDP, as dividends are usually distributed profits earned in the previous year.
All fractiles’ dividend or interest incomes show a high correlation with the
corresponding PIT total which indicates stable shares in total capital income. Thus,
the assumption that the distribution of total capital income remained stable in 2009
and 2010 does not seem strong.
Stock market dividends show the highest correlation with PIT dividend income
for almost all top fractile groups with decreasing correlations towards the top: cor-
relation coefficients exceed 0.90 for the top 10 % without the top 0.1 %, and decrease
to 0.79 for the top 0.01 %. Lagged GDP and national accounts dividends show less
correlation which also decreases towards the top. For the top 0.01 %, the correlation
with national accounts dividends slightly exceeds the correlation with stock market
dividends. Correlation with SOEP capital income is comparably low.
For interest income, the tax flow aggregate shows the highest correlation with
fractiles’ interest incomes. Correlations at the top are similar to dividend income.
However, for the top 0.01 % the correlation coefficient drops to 0.51.
The correlations with external totals confirm for both capital income sources
that the findings of Figure 6 hold over different top income fractiles. Based on these
results, we chose stock market dividends and the tax flow aggregate as proxies for
dividend income and interest income , respectively, and will apply the correlation
coefficients observed between 2001 and 2008 to derive dividend aggregates by fractile
for 2009 and 2010.14
Figure 7 and 8 display our extended series including capital income. As sce-
nario 3 is constructed to match the taxable income definition since 2009, this series
14Appendix Figure E.1 shows the level of capital income in selected (disjoint) fractiles between
2001 and 2008, as well as imputed values based on stock market dividends and the interest tax
flow aggregate between 2001 and 2013.
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Table 1: Correlation between fractile capital income and external aggregates
Dividends
DIVFRACTILE DIVPIT DIVNA DIVCDAX GDPLAG CAPSOEP DIVTF
sorting: 0 % rule (Scenario 3)
<P90 0.98 0.86 0.97 0.90 0.23 0.68
90–P95 1.00 0.81 0.94 0.92 0.19 0.68
95–P99 0.99 0.74 0.93 0.94 0.18 0.70
99–P99.5 1.00 0.79 0.94 0.92 0.19 0.69
99.5–P99.9 1.00 0.79 0.91 0.90 0.17 0.67
99.9–P99.99 0.98 0.81 0.86 0.81 0.14 0.64
Top 0.01 % 0.93 0.80 0.79 0.71 0.10 0.61
Interest
INTFRACTILE INTPIT INTNA – GDP CAPSOEP INTTF
sorting: 0 % rule (Scenario 3)
<P90 0.99 0.68 0.67 0.49 0.96
P90-P95 0.95 0.37 0.87 0.36 0.96
P95-P99 0.98 0.45 0.82 0.39 0.96
P99-P99.5 0.99 0.59 0.69 0.49 0.94
P99.5-P99.9 0.96 0.67 0.65 0.42 0.89
P99.9-P99.99 0.97 0.49 0.76 0.54 0.94
Top 0.01 % 0.57 0.08 0.21 0.39 0.51
Notes: Correlations between aggregated dividends / aggregated interest income by fractile. Sorting sc3: fractiles
defined excluding capital income (0 % rule) DIVFRACTILE/INTFRACTILE : Aggregated dividend/interest income
in (disjoint) fractile groups in PIT microdata DIVPIT /INTPIT : Total dividend/interest income in PIT microdata
DIVNA/INTNA: Household sector dividends/interest income in national accounts DIVCDAX : Aggregated divi-
dends from German stock companies (CDAX index) GDP/GDPLAG: (Lagged) GDP CAPGSOEP : Capital income
of top 5 % from SOEP microdata; We use fractile thresholds including capital gains, but excluding capital income
according to the thresholds derivable from PIT statistics since 2009. DIVTF /INTTF : Aggregated dividend/ interest
income calculated from tax flow statistics
Source: Own calculations using PIT microdata, stock market indices (CDAX), SOEP microdata,
national accounts, and tax flow statistics.
can be extended by the years 2009 and 2010 using PIT statistics. Scenario 3 corre-
sponds to the simulated scenario 3 in Figure 5 applying the 0 %-rule. Scenario 1a
is Scenario 1 in Figure 5 applying the 100 %-rule. Scenario 1b applies the 100 %-
rule with tax units sorted excluding capital income, which is the most comparable
concept to scenario 3 in 2009 and 2010. Scenario 1b is extended by the years 2009
and 2010 including imputed capital income using the capital income proxy discussed
above.
Including capital income in 2009 and 2010 perpetuates the trend of increasing
income concentration witnessed until 2008. As can be taken from Figure 7, we do
not find a pronounced drop in top income shares when including capital income.
Even though we find higher drops between 2008 and 2009 moving to the top, both
the extended scenario 1b and scenario 3 are smoother than the series based on the
original data suggest. Comparing scenario 1b and 3 we can conclude that neither
20







































Top 10% Sc1a Top 5% Sc1a Top 1% Sc1a
Top 10% Sc1b Top 5% Sc1b Top 1% Sc1b
Top 10% Sc3 Top 5% Sc3 Top 1% Sc3
Source: PIT statistics, own calculations. Note: Scenario 1a applies the 100 %-rule with tax units
sorted including capital income. Scenario 1b applies the 100 %-rule with tax units sorted excluding
capital income. Scenario 3 applies the 0 %-rule.
the concentration of capital or non-capital income was substantially reduced by the
crisis. The income share accruing to the top percentile fell by 6 % including capital
income (Scenario 1b) and by 7 % excluding capital income (Scenario 3). In contrast,
the original data suggest a decrease of 13 % for the top percentile. Consequently,
the drop observed in the original data Section 3 is at least by half attributable to
the exclusion of capital income from the tax base between 2008 and 2009.
In contrast to the series assessed on raw PIT statistics, our extended harmo-
nized series hence shows an even steeper increase in income concentration between
2001 and 2010. The income share with capital income accruing to the top decile is
8 % higher than the shares assessed on the original tax data in 2009. The share of
the top 0,01 % is 28 % higher.
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Top 0.1% Sc1a Top 0.01% Sc1a
Top 0.1% Sc1b Top 0.01% Sc1b
Top 0.1% Sc3 Top 0.01% Sc3
Source: PIT statistics, own calculations. Note: xx.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we derived a homogeneous series of top income shares including full
capital incomes for Germany to overcome the erosion of our data base. First, we
extended the existing WTID series of top income shares based on PIT statistics. We
extended the series including capital gains to 2010, and the series excluding capital
gains to 2008. Excluding taxable capital gains reduces top income shares only
by little, as capital gains were largely tax free in Germany before 2009. Second,
we used PIT microdata to explore the impact of the gradual exclusion of capital
income from PIT base on top income shares. We derived homogeneous series of top
income shares corresponding to varying income tax legislations and capital income
definitions. We find that the drop in unharmonized top income shares in 2009 is
mainly attributable to the disappearance of capital income from the underlying
data. The recession in 2009 seems to have had a minor impact on the top of the
German income distribution. Second, we find that the uncorrected series of top
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income shares understates the increase in income concentration that took place in
Germany between 2004 and 2008. Third, we explored the correlations between
top fractiles’ capital incomes and external capital income aggregates. We find that
a composite measure of stock dividends and interest income tax flows provides a
good proxy for capital income accruing to the rich over time. Using this proxy,
we extended our harmonized series of top income shares including capital income
to 2010. We find that accounting for missing capital income increases top income
shares by 6 % for the top decile and by almost 30 % for the top 0.01 % in 2009 and
2010. The output drop in 2009 did disproportionately hit the very top of the non-
capital income distribution, albeit to a smaller degree than shares obtained from
PIT statistics suggest. Missing capital income in income tax statistics will lead to
an underestimation of German top income shares assessed on the commonly used
income tax statistics in the future. At the same time, we expect higher income
accumulation at the top of the distribution following the tax reduction on capital
income which will not be documented by income tax statistics.
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Appendix A Sources of total income and total population
In the following, we explain the construction of our control totals in detail.
The control total for population is the number of individuals aged 20+ us-
ing population statistics from the Statistical Yearbooks following Dell (2007). E.g.,
numbers for the year 2008 are published in the Statistical Yearbook of 2010 (Statis-
tisches Jahrbuch 2010 ). The number of tax units is computed using the following
formula:
Tax Units = Married Couples/2 + Bachelors - Children (up to 19 years)
Table A.1: Control total for population, Germany, 1998-2010
Total tax units Total recorded













Source: PIT statistics, own calculations.
Note: Total recorded in tax statistics refers to income and payroll taxpayers in 1998 and to only income tax payers
from 2001 to 2010.
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The income total is based on the national accounts published in Fachserie 18
Reihe 1.5 Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen. Inlandsproduktberechnung, Lange
Reihen ab 1970, Stand Ma¨rz 2014. Total household income is the sum of
Compensation of employees (Residents) (Arbeitnehmerentgelt (Inla¨nder)) (Ta-
ble 1.3)
+ Operation surplus (Betriebsu¨berschuss) (Table 1.10)
+ Income of self-employed (Selbsta¨ndigeneinkommen) (Table 1.10)
+ Property income (Vermo¨genseinkommen) (Table 1.10)
- Employers’ actual social contributions (Sozialbeitra¨ge der Arbeitgeber) (Table
1.8).
= Total household income
Total household income, total income recorded in income tax statistics and our
control total is given in Table A.2. Control total is 90 % of total household income
following Dell (2007).
Table A.2: Control total for income, Germany, 1998-2010
Total household income Total income recorded Control total
Year in tax statistics
(bio. e) (mio. e) (mio. e)
1998 1,263.7 902,992 1,137,294
2001 1,354.0 963,858 1,218,627
2002 1,356.7 959,635 1,221,003
2003 1,375.3 939,915 1,237,761
2004 1,391.8 953,835 1,252,638
2005 1,423.9 996,304 1,281,483
2006 1,477.9 1,013,694 1,330,092
2007 1,528.14 1,067,377 1,375,326
2008 1,586.81 1,099,228 1,428,129
2009 1,544.41 1,061,489 1,389,969
2010 1,587.17 1,101,833 1,428,453
Source: National accounts (Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen), various years, own calculations.
Note: Values are in current Euro. Total income recorded in PIT statistics refers to income and payroll tax in 1998
and to only income tax from 2001 to 2010.
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Appendix B Tables of Key Results
The key results on top income shares based on both PIT statistics and PIT microdata
are given in Tables B.1 and B.2, respectively. Thresholds and average income for
various fractiles based on PIT statistics and PIT microdata are given in Tables B.3
and B.4, respectively.
Table B.1: Top income shares based on PIT statistics, 2001-2010
Year Top 10 % Top 5 % Top 1 % Top 0.5 % Top 0.1 % Top 0.01 %
including capital gains
2001 35.91 24.60 11.19 8.34 4.48 1.89
2002 35.69 24.17 10.56 7.71 4.00 1.73
2003 34.97 23.54 10.05 7.26 3.68 1.58
2004 35.02 23.70 10.29 7.47 3.80 1.61
2005 37.39 25.82 11.88 8.87 4.85 2.28
2006 37.01 25.73 12.01 8.99 4.92 2.23
2007 38.08 26.73 12.73 9.59 5.30 2.47
2008 38.30 27.00 12.94 9.73 5.30 2.38
2009 36.99 25.48 11.30 8.20 4.13 1.77
2010 37.70 26.11 11.81 8.65 4.49 1.97
Source: PIT statistics, own calculations.
Note: Tax statistics include income and payroll taxpayers in 1998 and only income taxpayers from 2001 to 2010.
28
Table B.2: Top income shares based on PIT microdata, 2001-2008
Year Top 10 % Top 5 % Top 1 % Top 0.5 % Top 0.1 % Top 0.01 %
including capital gains
2001 36.04 24.70 11.28 8.42 4.52 1.90
2002 35.32 23.83 10.32 7.51 3.86 1.65
2003 34.89 23.45 9.99 7.20 3.64 1.56
2004 35.30 23.93 10.47 7.63 3.92 1.68
2005 37.28 25.71 11.81 8.81 4.81 2.25
2006 37.02 25.73 12.01 9.00 4.92 2.23
2007 38.09 26.73 12.72 9.58 5.30 2.47
2008 38.31 27.01 12.93 9.73 5.31 2.38
excluding capital gains
2001 35.82 24.44 10.99 8.13 4.29 1.78
2002 34.99 23.43 9.88 7.08 3.48 1.38
2003 34.69 23.20 9.71 6.94 3.42 1.42
2004 35.04 23.63 10.14 7.31 3.66 1.51
2005 36.78 25.13 11.15 8.16 4.22 1.81
2006 36.60 25.24 11.45 8.45 4.45 1.92
2007 37.55 26.11 12.04 8.92 4.72 2.08
2008 38.00 26.64 12.53 9.34 4.97 2.17
excluding capital gains, ranked including
2001 35.72 24.33 10.87 8.01 4.17 1.69
2002 34.89 23.33 9.76 6.96 3.36 1.28
2003 34.59 23.10 9.61 6.83 3.32 1.35
2004 34.94 23.54 10.04 7.21 3.56 1.43
2005 36.70 25.04 11.06 8.07 4.13 1.73
2006 36.48 25.11 11.31 8.30 4.30 1.77
2007 37.49 26.04 11.96 8.83 4.62 1.98
2008 37.91 26.55 12.43 9.23 4.85 2.07
Source: PIT microdata, own calculations.
Note: Tax statistics include only income taxpayers.
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Table B.3: Thresholds and average incomes based on PIT statistics
Year Top 10 % Top 5 % Top 1 % Top 0.5 % Top 0.1 % Top 0.01 %
including capital gains
thresholds
2001 60,592 78,707 143,314 198,909 492,873 2,246,635
2002 58,899 76,069 136,378 191,218 423,507 1,736,659
2003 59,026 76,053 135,415 187,560 411,155 1,597,076
2004 60,021 78,834 143,314 196,258 438,440 1,732,794
2005 57,105 74,656 140,394 194,505 460,286 1,980,177
2006 58,197 76,652 148,273 206,986 498,124 2,245,317
2007 59,768 78,576 158,530 222,919 499,053 2,454,337
2008 59,536 79,104 162,319 230,545 531,899 2,501,911
2009 58,939 78,238 153,775 211,831 472,657 1,767,323
2010 59,659 79,621 157,161 217,574 497,781 1,988,181
average incomes
2001 107,415 147,201 334,853 499,123 1,338,884 5,646,915
2002 101,045 136,833 298,802 436,686 1,131,571 4,887,672
2003 99,629 134,121 286,278 413,669 1,049,627 4,507,042
2004 104,430 141,380 306,741 445,488 1,133,249 4,787,375
2005 102,719 141,854 326,212 487,352 1,332,172 6,251,256
2006 106,905 148,675 346,961 519,684 1,422,471 6,455,387
2007 112,911 158,500 377,397 568,480 1,570,692 7,323,307
2008 114,232 161,075 385,838 580,665 1,581,202 7,110,313
2009 106,519 146,733 325,474 472,018 1,189,551 5,089,109
2010 109,484 151,640 342,813 502,643 1,302,720 5,711,967
Source: PIT statistics, own calculations.
Note: Tax statistics include only income taxpayers. All figures in 2010 prices.
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Table B.4: Thresholds and average incomes based on PIT microdata
Year Top 10 % Top 5 % Top 1 % Top 0.5 % Top 0.1 % Top 0.01 %
including capital gains
thresholds
2001 59,219 78,524 147,133 205,219 498,301 2,238,996
2002 58,292 77,367 141,654 193,051 432,088 1,751,616
2003 57,626 76,795 140,275 189,490 413,570 1,604,844
2004 58,888 78,684 146,501 200,640 451,066 1,834,096
2005 57,314 77,330 147,448 204,569 478,436 2,062,078
2006 57,768 78,371 153,223 214,245 510,827 2,293,026
2007 58,181 79,463 159,104 225,108 541,863 2,454,649
2008 58,094 79,788 162,760 231,508 565,222 2,501,861
average incomes
2001 107,383 147,187 336,115 501,487 1,347,296 5,664,665
2002 102,298 138,009 298,920 435,160 1,118,084 4,770,883
2003 100,576 135,166 287,863 415,264 1,049,526 4,487,702
2004 104,853 142,201 311,058 453,407 1,164,894 4,993,472
2005 106,329 146,654 336,696 502,632 1,372,144 6,427,489
2006 109,373 152,058 354,936 531,646 1,454,856 6,590,898
2007 112,881 158,406 377,018 567,929 1,569,966 7,317,652
2008 114,233 161,038 385,586 580,295 1,581,931 7,108,534
excluding capital gains
thresholds
2001 59,155 78,403 146,231 202,880 482,610 2,097,889
2002 58,216 77,223 140,646 190,627 416,537 1,568,500
2003 57,555 76,663 139,425 187,433 401,060 1,503,807
2004 58,815 78,540 145,525 198,270 436,414 1,703,690
2005 57,221 77,149 146,157 201,440 459,131 1,854,054
2006 57,668 78,174 151,709 210,868 488,197 2,067,020
2007 58,083 79,265 157,479 221,164 517,330 2,175,782
2008 58,076 79,740 161,942 229,230 548,887 2,317,341
average incomes
2001 106,185 144,876 325,698 482,113 1,272,839 5,291,112
2002 100,632 134,779 284,069 407,018 1,000,168 3,983,845
2003 99,494 133,097 278,677 398,197 982,525 4,079,326
2004 103,540 139,674 299,705 432,244 1,080,645 4,472,641
2005 103,928 141,979 314,998 461,227 1,193,630 5,118,844
2006 107,159 147,763 335,337 494,685 1,302,461 5,623,890
2007 110,277 153,334 353,645 523,690 1,384,818 6,100,742
2008 112,783 158,167 371,961 554,388 1,474,699 6,445,920
Source: PIT microdata, own calculations.
Note: Tax statistics include only income taxpayers. All figures in 2010 prices.
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Table B.5: Top income shares under simulated tax regimes
Year Top 10 % Top 5 % Top 1 % Top 0.5 % Top 0.1 % Top 0.01 %
100 % rule (Scenario 1), PIT microdata simulation
2001 36.17 24.83 11.40 8.54 4.63 1.97
2002 36.11 24.60 11.05 8.21 4.45 2.04
2003 35.52 24.05 10.54 7.72 4.07 1.83
2004 36.01 24.63 11.10 8.23 4.40 1.96
2005 38.51 26.91 12.93 9.89 5.74 2.88
2006 38.35 27.03 13.22 10.15 5.90 2.86
2007 39.55 28.14 14.04 10.83 6.33 3.13
2008 40.03 28.69 14.52 11.23 6.51 3.07
50 % rule (Scenario 2), PIT microdata simulation
2001 35.29 23.99 10.66 7.85 4.11 1.71
2002 35.28 23.79 10.29 7.48 3.84 1.64
2003 34.89 23.44 9.98 7.20 3.64 1.55
2004 35.30 23.93 10.47 7.63 3.92 1.68
2005 37.28 25.71 11.81 8.81 4.81 2.25
2006 37.02 25.73 12.01 9.00 4.92 2.23
2007 38.09 26.73 12.72 9.58 5.30 2.47
2008 38.31 27.01 12.93 9.73 5.31 2.38
0 % rule (Scenario 3), PIT microdata simulation
2001 34.35 23.14 10.01 7.30 3.78 1.60
2002 34.58 23.18 9.84 7.10 3.61 1.56
2003 34.21 22.86 9.56 6.84 3.42 1.47
2004 34.60 23.33 10.02 7.25 3.69 1.58
2005 36.51 25.03 11.30 8.39 4.56 2.18
2006 36.21 25.02 11.49 8.56 4.68 2.18
2007 37.03 25.82 12.10 9.07 5.03 2.41
2008 37.05 25.90 12.13 9.06 4.92 2.25
0 % rule (Scenario 3), PIT statistics
2009 36.99 25.48 11.30 8.20 4.13 1.77
2010 37.70 26.11 11.81 8.65 4.49 1.97
Source: PIT microdata and PIT statistics, own calculations.
Note: Shares refer to income including capital gains. The 100 % rule includes capital income (interest & gross
dividends) fully and corresponds to pre-2002 PIT legislation. The 50 % rule includes 37.5 % of gross dividends and
corresponds to PIT legislation from 2002 to 2008. The 0 % rule exludes capital income (interest & gross dividends)




In Germany, there are two series of tabulated income tax statistics provided by
Destatis: A payroll tax and income tax statistic is published every three years and
includes both payroll and income taxpayers. These data are the source for the series
1891-1998 produced by Dell (2007). The personal income tax statistic is provided
annually since 2001 and comprises all tax units that filed an income tax return in
the respective year. These data are the source for the extension of the German
series in the WTID by Dell (2011). Both data provide the number of tax units
and reported income by income bracket. Threeannual data contain information on
income composition by income bracket, additionally.
Tax Flow Statistics
Tax flow statistics are provided annually by Destatis and report aggregated tax flows
by tax type. These types comprise the withholding tax on dividend income (since
1992) and on interest income (since 1993). Tax bases correspond to taxable income
on the personal and on the corporate level. Since 2009, tax flows have continued to
be reported for dividends and interest separately. However, the tax flow on interest
has since been reported jointly with the tax flow on capital gains from stock shares.
Stock Market Indices
The most comprehensive German stock market index (CDAX) includes all German
stocks that are traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange. There are two CDAX
time series: the performance index describes the value of the market portfolio with
reinvested dividends. The course index describes the value of the market portfolio
without reinvested dividends. Both are corrected for events that have no impact
on portfolio values, such as the issuing of new stocks. The dividend sum can be
computed by multiplying the difference between the two indices’ monthly growth
rates by the market capitalization. Both indices are published as a monthly time
series by the German Central Bank (Bundesbank) since 1994. Time series nos.
are BBK01.WU001A (CDAX course index), BBK01.WU018A (CDAX performance
index), and BBK01.WU080U (CDAX market capitalization, since 1999). For details
on index computation see Deutsche Bo¨rse AG (2014).
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PIT Microdata
We use microdata on PIT returns from 2001 to 2008. The data is the full sample
of all German income tax returns for these years and serves also as the basis for
annual tabulated statistics. Like the annual statistics, these data do not contain
tax units who receive wage income only and do not file an income tax return. The
impact of these missing cases for the top is limited as explained in ??. The data
comprise details on the tax unit’s income composition. In particular, the level of
taxable capital gains, capital income and dividends are reported. The microdata
are provided by Destatis.
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Appendix D Changes to the Definition of Taxable Income
in Germany
Capital income consisting of interest income and divideds gradually disappeared
from the progressive PIT base over the past 15 years in Germany. Reforms since
2001 most frequently modified the taxation of dividends, but also the taxation of
interest income and capital gains. Finally in 2009, the introduction of a flat tax
on capital income (Abgeltungsteuer) removed this income source from the PIT base
completely and consequently from income tax statistics as well. In the following,
we describe regulatory changes to the taxation of capital gains and capital income
and their impact on income tax data as a data source for the estimation of top
income shares. Since we use both PIT statistics and PIT microdata, we focus on
the reforms’ impact on both gross taxable income as reported in the PIT statistics
and the PIT microdata quality with respect to top incomes.
D.1 Composition of Taxable Income
The composition of aggregate taxable income and its development over the period
1992-2010 is illustrated in Figure D.1. Wages are by far the most important income
source in Germany amounting to about 80 % of aggregate taxable income, whereas
income from agriculture and forestry contribute an almost negligible share. The
share of capital income consisting of interest income and dividends decreases sharply
both after the exclusion of a large part of dividends in 2002 and after the introduction
of a flat tax for capital income in 2009. Since then, capital income is not documented
in income tax data with only few exceptions described in Section D.3.
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Table D.1: Composition of aggregate taxable income in billion Euro)
GTIa A & Fb Businessc Self-Empl. Waged Capitale R & Lf Otherg
pre 2001/2002
1992 792.6 6.2 (0.8) 73.4 (9.2) 35.1 (4.4) 649.1 (81.6) 27.4 (3.4) -5.5 (-0.7) 10.2 (1.3)
1995 843.7 6.3 (0.7) 69.9 (8.3) 39.4 (4.7) 711.3 (84.0) 16.9 (2.0) -11.3 (-1.3) 14.2 (1.7)
1998 890.9 7.7 (0.9) 86.7 (9.7) 48.6 (5.4) 729.5 (81.6) 22.7 (2.5) -16.5 (-1.8) 15.2 (1.7)
2001 959.2 7.8 (0.8) 71.4 (7.5) 51.9 (5.4) 775.6 (81.3) 32.2 (3.4) -3.3 (-0.3) 18.9 (2.0)
50 % Rule
2002 949.9 7.0 (0.7) 70.2 (7.4) 52.6 (5.6) 776.5 (82.3) 19.3 (2.0) -1.3 (-0.1) 19.4 (2.1)
2003 934.9 6.8 (0.7) 71.8 (7.7) 52.4 (5.6) 765.3 (81.9) 17.0 (1.8) 0.9 (0.1) 20.0 (2.1)
2004 945.5 7.2 (0.8) 78.8 (8.3) 55.3 (5.8) 767.4 (80.7) 16.4 (1.7) 5.1 (0.5) 20.5 (2.2)
2005 990.1 7.7 (0.8) 93.9 (9.5) 58.9 (5.9) 768.6 (77.5) 19.0 (1.9) 7.1 (0.7) 37.1 (3.7)
2006 1008.2 8.2 (0.8) 104.7 (10.3) 60.9 (6.0) 772.8 (76.3) 20.2 (2.0) 8.5 (0.8) 38.0 (3.8)
2007 1061.4 9.2 (0.9) 113.8 (10.7) 65.8 (6.2) 797.3 (74.7) 29.1 (2.7) 10.9 (1.0) 41.0 (3.8)
2008 1092.3 8.9 (0.8) 118.0 (10.7) 69.6 (6.3) 811.9 (73.9) 35.9 (3.3) 12.0 (1.1) 41.8 (3.8)
Dual Tariff
2009ah 1054.8 7.9 (0.7) 101.0 (9.5) 68.9 (6.5) 812.5 (76.6) 11.9 (1.1) 14.5 (1.4) 43.7 (4.1)
2009bh 1074.9 7.9 (0.7) 101.0 (9.4) 68.9 (6.4) 812.5 (75.4) 29.7 (2.8) 14.5 (1.3) 43.7 (4.1)
Notes: Values are in current billione . Values in parentheses are the share of each income source in total taxable
income. Annual tax statistics do not include non-filers (filing is not mandatory for tax units who earn exclusively
wage income). Exact shares can therefore differ from shares in the three-annual statistic, which comprises all wage
earners (1995-2007 figures in Table ??). aGTI: gross taxable income. bA & F: Agriculture and Forestry. cBusiness:
unincorporated business income. d Wage: includes pensions from civil servants (Beamte) eCapital income: taxable
dividends and interest income. fR & L: Renting and Leasing. gOther: predominantly pensions and some taxable
capital gains (from stock shares and real estate). h2009a and 2009b define capital income differently: 2009a shows
figures for those capital incomes that are taxed with the personal tax rate, and the corresponding GTI (tax statistics
definition). 2009b additionally includes those capital incomes, that are taxed at the withholding tax rate, but are
nonetheless reported in the PIT files. Capital income shares in 2009b refer to a correspondingly corrected measure
of GTI.
Source: own calculation based on Destatis (1996, 1998-2007, 2000, 2001-2010).
Figure D.1: Composition of taxable income in Germany, 1992-2010
in income tax data with only few exceptions we will describe in Section E.2. In
contrast, other income including certain kinds of capital gains ... expands which is
du to... Comme t on rising share of business income? (Das ist in 2009 vermutlich
eher crisis als shifting)















































Source: Own calculations since 2001.
Z.T. in Haupttext u¨bernommen:
The composition of incomes changes when moving to the top of the income distri-
bution. Figure 4 gives the income composition by fractile. The bottom half of the
top decile generates 90% of income through wages. For the next four percent this
drops to 80% and then continues to decrease quite sharply. The top 0.01% has a
wage share of only 10%. Self-employed22 are concentrated between P99 and P99.99.
The very top accrues the bulk of their income from business. Even though capital
income is highly concentrated among top income individuals, neither interest in-
come nor dividends (capital income) generate a substantial (?) part of top income
in 2001, 2004 or 2007. However, we see a decline of capital income share in the top
fractiles from a maximum of almost 30% in 2001 for the top 0.01% to about 10%
in 2004 and an 2007. This is due to exceptionally high dividend payments in 2001
22Self-employed income and unincorporated business income differ by the payment of the local
business tax. Some professions are excluded from its liability (mostly physicians and lawyers) and
their income is than classified as self-employed instead of business.
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Source: Own calculations since 2001.
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D.2 Taxation of Capital Gains
German tax law distinguishes five types of capital gains: capital gains from financial
assets (i), capital gains from real estate (ii), capital gains from selling a not incor-
porated business (iii), capital gains from selling shares of a closely held corporation
(iv) and capital gains realized inside the unincorporated business sphere (v).15 In
post-war Germany, a large portion of these capital gains has always been tax ex-
empt. As a consequence, private capital gains reported in German tax statistics are
fairly low16 and can only be reconstructed partly by using PIT microdata.
Capital gains from financial assets (i) and real estate (ii) were tax exempt if
held longer than a certain time period. We therefore observe them only to a limited
degree in microdata. For those capital gains from stock shares that were reported,
only 50 % were taxable between 2002 and 2008. For capital gains from financial
assets, this exemption ended in 2009: since then, they have been excluded from the
PIT and instead fully subject to the flat tax on capital income.17
Capital gains from selling an unincorporated business (iii) are only taxable if
exceeding a quite elevated threshold. But if these capital gains exceed the threshold,
the taxable share is reported quite consistently in PIT files over time. Capital gains
from selling shares of a corporation (iv) are taxable if the tax unit’s share exceeds
a certain threshold.18 Capital gains of this type typically stem from closely held
companies, but apply to stock company shares as well, if the tax unit’s capital share
is high enough. Capital gains (iv) have thus always been included in PIT files, and
their size is reconstructible from micro data. Their taxable share, however, changed
from 100 % before 2002 to 50 % in 2002, and 60 % in 2009. Their contribution to
gross taxable income in PIT statistics is thus mechanically reduced in 2002 and
slightly increases again after 2009.
Last, capital gains can also be realized inside the business sphere (v) as part
of the business profit. In these cases, we do not observe capital gains as such in the
microdata, but it is included in the business profit and therefore in gross taxable
income. This might be relevant after 2009, as it has become more attractive to shift
capital income to the business sphere.
As capital gains from financial assets and real estate have been mostly tax
15None of the five types of capital gains was ever part of the PIT’s definition of capital income
until 2009. Type (i) and (ii) were classified as ”other” income, and type (iii) to (v) accrue to
agriculture and forestry, self-employed, or business income. Only type (i) has been classified as
capital income since 2009, if it is reported in the PIT file.
16In some years, capital gains reported in tax statistics were even negative in sum, as losses were
deductible from other income sources under certain conditions.
17For financial assets (i), this period was six months until 1998 and one year from 1999 to 2008.
For real estate, the period was two years until 1998 and since then ten years.
18The threshold for corporation shares was 1 % until 1995, 25 % from 1996 to 1998, 10 % from
1999 to 2001, and since then 1 % again.
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exempt, capital gains in German PIT files predominantly stem from selling unin-
corporated businesses (iii) and corporation shares (iv) where the tax unit holds a
considerable share.
D.3 Taxation of Capital Income
In the last two decades, two tax reforms (2001/02, 2009) reduced the level of taxable
capital income and hence reduced the level of gross taxable income (GTI) (Ge-
samtbetrag der Einku¨nfte) reported in PIT files. As capital income is concentrated
at the top of the income distribution, top income shares based on PIT statistics
are also reduced mechanically. Reforms mainly changed the taxation of dividends.
Legislative changes to the taxation of capital income are summarized in Table D.3.
Table D.2: Changes in Capital Income Taxation
GTI Definition in PIT
pre 2001 Y−C + (INT −DeductINT ) + (Dgross −DeductDgross)
2001/02–2008 Y−C + (INT −DeductINT ) + (Dgross · (1− tcorp)−DeductDgross) · 0.5
since 2009 (i) Y−C + INT + (Dgross · (1− tcorp)
(ii) Y−C
(iii) Y−C + Yshifted
Notes: Dgross: gross dividend before corporate taxation; INT: interest income; Deduct: deductions always refer
to expenses that directly relate to the tax base. tcorp: corporation tax rate applied to dividends
Source: German income tax law (ESTG).
Pre 2001
• Dividends from German corporations are subject to the corporation tax. Before
2001, the corporation tax on distributed dividends was a pure pre-tax to the PIT.
The gross dividend, say, e.g., 100e, was subject to the corporation tax of 30 %.
The shareholder received the cash dividend of 70e. However, the shareholder’s
GTI comprised the full gross dividend of 100e, which was then taxed at the
personal tax rate. The corporation tax could be credited against the resulting
PIT tax claim. GTI before 2001 thus included gross dividends before taxes on
the corporation level.
• Interest income was also fully taxable at the personal PIT rate.
• Capital income related expenses19 could be fully deducted and therefore reduced
GTI.
19These are, e.g., capital costs, travel expenses related to general meetings, etc.
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Table D.3: Changes in Capital Income Taxation
pre 2001 2001/02–2008 since 2009
Gross Dividends (Dgross)
tax base 100 % (1− tcorp) ∗ 50 % (1− tcorp) ∗ 100 %
deductions 100 % 50 % –
tax rate PIT PIT min(W,PIT )
corp. tax credit yes no no
income source capital capital capital
Interest (INT)
tax base 100 % 100 % 100 %
deductions 100 % 100 % –
tax rate PIT PIT min(W,PIT )
income source capital capital capital
Cap. Gains from Stock Shares (GC I)
tax base 100 % 50 % 100 %
deductions 100 % 50 % –
tax rate PIT PIT min(W,PIT )
definition specific casesa specific casesa comprehensiveb
income source other other capital
Cap. Gains from Closely Held Corporations (GC II)
& Dividends / CG I in Private Business Sphere
tax base 100 % 50 % 60 %
deductions 100 % 50 % 60 %
tax rate PIT PIT PIT
income source business business business
tcorp( %) 30 % 25 % 15 %
Notes: Dgross: gross dividend before corporate taxation; INT: interest income; CG I: capital gains
from stock shares; CG II: capital gains from closely held corporations; deductions always refer to
expenses that directly relate to the tax base. aspecific cases: CG I were only taxable if the assets had
been held less than one year. bcomprehensive: all CG I are taxable if the assets were acquired in 2009
or later. Otherwise, CG I are still tax exempt.
Source: German income tax law (ESTG)
2001/2002-2008: 50 % Rule
• The definition of taxable dividend income in the PIT changed in 2001/2002.20
Instead of gross dividends, the new taxable income definition was half the cash
dividend (50 % rule; 35e in the example above). At the same time, the corporate
level taxes could not be credited against the PIT any more. The resulting effective
tax rate on the gross dividend was comparable to the tax rate before 2001/2002,
20For dividends issued by German corporations, legislative changes started to apply in 2002 in
most cases. This was the case for the largest share of dividends.
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but GTI observed in the income tax data was considerably reduced. In addition,
the 50 % rule also applied to capital gains from corporation shares (if taxable),
which similarly reduced GTI if capital gains were positive (see section 2.1).
• Interest income remained fully taxable at the personal PIT rate.
• Only half of the capital income related expenses could be deducted, as far as
the expenses were related to dividends. Capital income related expenses that
stemmed from interest income remained fully deductible.
Figure D.2: Changes in GTI due to 50 % rule
Notes: Pre 2001: 100 % of the gross dividend before corporate taxation entered
GTI. The 50 % rule reduced the share to 37.5 %. Effective tax rate changed only
to a little extent, as the tax credit was abolished at the same time.
Source: German income tax law.
Post 2009: Dual Tariff
Since 2009, capital income is not included in the PIT schedule any more and thus
in PIT files neither. Capital income from dividends, interest income, and capital
gains from stock shares are taxed at a flat withholding tax rate of 25 % instead.21 At
the same time, negative capital income and capital income related expenses cannot
21This reform also broadened the tax base, since capital gains from stock shares were typically
not taxable before 2008. Before 2008, capital gains from stock shares were only taxable if the shares
had been held less than one year. However, the base broadening only applies to stock shares that
have been obtained after 2008. We therefore do not expect any effect of the tax base broadening
in 2009, but an increasing effect on taxable capital income since 2010.
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be deducted from taxable income any more. However, it is still possible to report
capital income in the PIT and is favorable for the tax unit in the following cases:
(i) If the personal tax rate undercuts the withholding tax rate, the personal tax
rate is applied. In these cases, the reported capital income is also included in
the tax units’ GTI.
(ii) Capital income is only taxable as far as it exceeds the saver’s allowance of
810e. Some tax units do not claim the full allowance towards the institutions
that withhold the tax (e.g. banks, corporations). Then, the allowance can be
obtained by reporting capital income in the PIT file. Capital income above the
allowance is then taxed at the withholding tax rate (or with the personal tax
rate in case (i)). In these cases, the reported capital income is not included in
the tax units’ GTI.
(iii) If capital income is realized in the private business sphere instead of the private
sphere, the former 50 % rule is changed to a new 60 % rule: 60 % of cash divi-
dends and capital gains from stocks are taxable at the personal PIT rate, and
100 % of interest income. In turn, the same share (60 % or 100 %) of capital
related expenses is deductable again. Therefore, shifting capital income from
the private to the business sphere is favorable for tax units with high capital
related expenses. Before the introduction of the reform, this type of shifting
was indeed recommended by the tax adviser literature (Maier and Wengenroth,
2007, Worgulla and So¨ffing, 2007). The 60 % rule also applies (in any case) to
capital gains from closely held corporations’ shares (see Section 2.1). If capital
income has been shifted to the business sphere, it is reported in the PIT records
again, albeit only 60 % of dividends and capital gains from corporation shares
enter the GTI definition. In addition, this capital income is reported as business
income.
The tariff dualization reduced the capital income observed in the PIT to zero in most
cases. Only capital income that is taxed at the personal tax rate is still included in
GTI and reported in tax statistics (case (i)). If the savers’ allowance was not fully
claimed, capital income is still reported, but not included in GTI and not necessarily
reported in income tax statistics (case (ii)). Last, a portion of capital income is likely
to have been realized in the private business sphere reported as business income in
the PIT files. Consequently, in the first post-reform year 2009, the capital income
share in positive GTI as reported in tax statistics dropped from 3.3 % in 2008 to
1.1 % in 2009.22
22Table D.4 shows the share of capital incomes in GTI since 1992.
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Table D.4: Taxable income composition by fractile
Fractile GTI (e)
Composition of GTI (% of GTI) CG (% of GTI)
GTI a&f bus self wage cap r&l other business private
2001
0.01 5,740,096 100.00 0.30 60.67 2.38 9.22 23.81 0.37 0.75 11.96 -0.17
P99.9–99.99 873,837 100.00 0.83 32.22 15.92 27.15 19.84 1.22 0.70 6.19 -0.50
P99.5–99.9 291,011 100.00 0.85 15.45 27.33 42.79 9.96 0.21 0.69 2.25 -0.27
P99–99.5 171,040 100.00 0.89 11.53 22.07 58.52 5.26 -0.38 0.68 0.80 -0.17
P95–99 100,026 100.00 0.83 7.59 8.38 80.59 2.28 -0.45 0.53 0.27 -0.04
P90–95 67,605 100.00 0.68 5.05 2.95 89.87 1.27 -0.35 0.48 0.11 -0.04
2002
0.01 4,879,585 100.00 0.53 72.17 4.05 9.66 11.05 1.03 0.89 23.14 0.14
P99.9–99.99 717,663 100.00 0.91 29.60 21.51 30.90 9.88 2.28 0.78 7.03 -0.07
P99.5–99.9 265,366 100.00 0.79 16.16 29.26 46.14 5.14 0.75 0.68 2.08 0.06
P99–99.5 162,995 100.00 0.83 11.42 21.49 61.96 2.92 0.10 0.66 0.82 0.05
P95–99 97,855 100.00 0.73 7.12 7.87 82.37 1.44 -0.20 0.52 0.24 0.03
P90–95 66,615 100.00 0.62 4.87 2.93 90.35 0.94 -0.21 0.49 0.10 0.01
2003
0.01 4,566,071 100.00 0.49 73.56 4.05 9.33 9.32 1.36 1.31 13.11 0.46
P99.9–99.99 672,551 100.00 0.91 33.66 23.06 29.42 8.32 2.76 0.95 5.45 0.41
P99.5–99.9 257,612 100.00 0.79 16.58 29.19 46.47 4.39 1.22 0.74 1.70 0.21
P99–99.5 160,766 100.00 0.84 11.67 20.96 62.56 2.62 0.33 0.71 0.62 0.15
P95–99 97,069 100.00 0.71 7.09 7.72 82.52 1.30 0.03 0.55 0.21 0.08
P90–95 66,016 100.00 0.62 4.90 2.93 90.23 0.87 -0.06 0.53 0.07 0.04
2004
0.01 5,060,803 100.00 0.30 75.46 3.42 9.16 9.09 1.42 1.09 14.60 0.50
P99.9–99.99 746,177 100.00 0.91 37.35 21.74 28.36 7.60 3.20 0.88 5.26 0.48
P99.5–99.9 276,635 100.00 0.89 18.50 29.80 44.00 4.28 1.91 0.73 1.80 0.25
P99–99.5 169,073 100.00 0.95 12.99 22.07 59.86 2.54 1.02 0.70 0.62 0.17
P95–99 100,078 100.00 0.82 7.74 8.29 80.99 1.28 0.45 0.56 0.23 0.09
P90–95 67,539 100.00 0.68 5.26 3.12 89.46 0.84 0.26 0.53 0.08 0.04
2005
0.01 6,613,365 100.00 0.24 77.93 2.95 9.15 8.30 0.74 0.67 24.33 0.53
P99.9–99.99 817,761 100.00 0.81 38.07 19.93 28.72 8.38 3.05 1.10 6.29 0.65
P99.5–99.9 286,471 100.00 0.88 19.50 28.66 43.62 4.47 2.01 0.96 2.15 0.37
P99–99.5 171,157 100.00 0.99 13.50 21.85 58.93 2.52 1.34 1.00 0.80 0.27
P95–99 99,245 100.00 0.89 7.95 8.30 80.15 1.30 0.69 0.86 0.24 0.14
P90–95 66,041 100.00 0.75 5.41 3.09 88.67 0.88 0.46 0.94 0.09 0.07
2006
0.01 6,766,318 100.00 0.33 77.89 2.83 9.84 7.03 0.57 1.51 20.71 1.25
P99.9–99.99 892,534 100.00 0.89 40.66 17.45 28.01 8.86 2.76 1.42 6.24 0.94
P99.5–99.9 302,308 100.00 0.98 21.18 26.82 43.12 4.75 2.17 1.08 2.12 0.48
P99–99.5 178,713 100.00 1.05 14.78 21.77 57.18 2.77 1.54 1.04 0.78 0.30
5P95–99 101,462 100.00 0.99 8.97 8.80 78.20 1.43 0.85 0.89 0.24 0.15
P90–95 66,735 100.00 0.80 5.98 3.28 87.70 0.94 0.55 0.95 0.08 0.08
2007
0.01 7,416,255 100.00 0.36 78.21 3.04 8.79 7.75 0.53 1.30 19.66 0.98
P99.9–99.99 940,272 100.00 0.95 41.28 17.00 27.45 9.38 2.42 1.57 6.61 1.03
P99.5–99.9 318,904 100.00 1.16 21.13 26.36 42.08 5.94 2.31 1.12 2.19 0.48
P99–99.5 186,618 100.00 1.29 14.95 22.71 54.64 3.74 1.76 1.05 0.83 0.25
P95–99 103,895 100.00 1.18 9.24 9.12 76.46 2.11 1.10 0.93 0.26 0.14
P90–95 67,406 100.00 0.88 6.17 3.37 86.58 1.45 0.76 0.99 0.09 0.07
2008
0.01 7,261,580 100.00 0.35 74.92 2.93 8.75 11.46 0.66 0.93 13.33 -0.12
P99.9–99.99 976,117 100.00 0.92 41.87 15.94 25.85 11.96 2.52 0.99 5.80 -0.46
P99.5–99.9 331,312 100.00 1.07 22.69 26.18 39.59 7.30 2.38 0.90 2.01 -0.38
P99–99.5 191,375 100.00 1.18 16.41 22.95 52.39 4.47 1.76 0.97 0.74 -0.24
P95–99 105,034 100.00 1.09 9.79 9.42 75.33 2.43 1.19 0.90 0.23 -0.13
P90–95 67,475 100.00 0.81 6.11 3.44 86.35 1.65 0.82 1.02 0.08 -0.08
Notes: Fractiles defined including capital gains. Average GTI in prices of 2010.
Source: PIT microdata, own calculations.
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Appendix E Imputing Missing Capital Income, 2009–2010
Figure E.1: PIT Fractile Totals and Predictions (2001–2008) sample












































PIT: DIV P90-95 PIT: DIV P90-95 Predict












































PIT: DIV P99-99.5 PIT: DIV P99-99.5 Predict














































PIT: INT P90-95 PIT: INT P90-95 Predict














































PIT: INT P99-99.5 PIT: INT P99-99.5 Predict














































PIT: CAP P90-95 PIT: CAP P90-95 Predict












































PIT: CAP P99-99.5 PIT: CAP P99-99.5 Predict
PIT: CAP P99.9-99.99 PIT: CAP P99.9-99.99 Predict
Source: Own calculations using PIT Microdata, tax flow statistics, PIT Statistics, stock market
indices (CDAX), and German national accounts. Real values in 2010 prices. Dashed lines are 95 %
confidence intervals for forecasts. Fractiles defined without capital income as to match 0 % rule
sorting after 2009. Predictions based on 2001–2008 sample.
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Figure E.2: PIT Fractile Totals and Predictions (2001–2007 sample)
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PIT: INT P99-99.5 PIT: INT P99-99.5 Predict
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PIT: CAP P99-99.5 PIT: CAP P99-99.5 Predict
PIT: CAP P99.9-99.99 PIT: CAP P99.9-99.99 Predict
Source:Own calculations using PIT Microdata, tax flow statistics, PIT Statistics, stock market
indices (CDAX), and German national accounts. Real values in 2010 prices. Dashed lines are 95 %
confidence intervals for forecasts. Fractiles defined without capital income as to match 0 % rule
sorting after 2009. Predictions based on 2001–2007 sample.
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Tax Flow: INT PIT: INT Total
Source:Own calculations using PIT Microdata, Tax flow statistics, Tabulated Income Tax Statis-
tics, stock market indices (CDAX), and German national accounts. Real values in 2010 prices.
Dashed lines are 95 % confidence intervals for forecasts.
Figure E.4: Evolution of Real Saver’s Allowance, 1975–2013
Notes: All figures in real prices 2013. Phases I to IV separate phases of compa-
rable levels of the savers’ allowance
Source: Own calculations using German income tax law and German
consumer price index.
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Top 10% Tax data Top 5% Tax data Top 1% Tax data
Top 10% SOEP Top 5% SOEP Top 1% SOEP
Source: Own calculations using SOEP data.
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Table E.1: Correlations: fractile capital income and external aggregates
Dividends
DIVFRACTILE DIVPIT DIVNA DIVCDAX GDPLAG CAPSOEP DIVTF
sorting: 100 % rule (Scenario 1)
<P90 0.90 0.94 0.88 0.75 0.08 0.48
P90–P95 0.97 0.89 0.97 0.89 0.22 0.63
P95–P99 0.98 0.83 0.97 0.93 0.24 0.68
P99–P99.5 0.99 0.78 0.95 0.95 0.19 0.69
P99.5–P99.9 0.99 0.78 0.95 0.94 0.21 0.70
P99.9–P99.99 0.99 0.81 0.90 0.86 0.19 0.68
Top 0.01 % 0.98 0.71 0.84 0.85 0.10 0.68
DIVNA 0.80 1.00
DIVCDAX 0.93 0.80 1.00
GDPLAG 0.90 0.61 0.94 1.00
CAPSOEP 0.18 0.10 0.31 0.17 1.00
DIVTF 0.68 0.30 0.72 0.71 0.64 1.00
Interest
INTFRACTILE INTPIT INTNA – GDP CAPSOEP INTTF
sorting: 100 % rule (Scenario 1)
<P90 0.99 0.55 – 0.78 0.48 0.98
P90–P95 0.96 0.41 – 0.85 0.33 0.98
P95–P99 0.99 0.53 – 0.78 0.40 0.98
P99–P99.5 0.97 0.69 – 0.58 0.46 0.91
P99.5–P99.9 0.92 0.73 – 0.46 0.52 0.82
P99.9–P99.99 0.90 0.75 – 0.45 0.48 0.80
Top 0.01 % 0.70 0.37 – 0.29 0.51 0.60
INTNA 0.59 1.00 –
GDP 0.72 0.08 – 1.00
CAPSOEP 0.47 0.26 – 0.34 1.00
INTTF 0.97 0.54 – 0.75 0.34 1.00
Notes: Correlations between aggregated dividends / aggregated interest income by fractile. Sorting sc1: frac-
tiles defined including capital income (100 % rule). Sorting sc3: fractiles defined excluding capital income (0 %
rule) DIVFRACTILE/INTFRACTILE : Aggregated dividend/interest income in (disjoint) fractile groups in PIT
microdata DIVPIT /INTPIT : Total dividend/interest income in PIT microdata DIVNA/INTNA: Household sector
dividends/interest income in national accounts DIVCDAX : Aggregated dividends from German stock companies
(CDAX index) GDP/GDPLAG: (Lagged) GDP CAPGSOEP : Capital income of top 5 % from SOEP microdata
DIVTF /INTTF : Aggregated dividend/ interest income calculated from tax flow statistics
Source: Own calculations using PIT microdata, stock market indices (CDAX), SOEP microdata,
national accounts, and tax flow statistics
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Table E.2: Top income shares including capital income (Scenario 1b), 2001-2010
Year Top 10 % Top 5 % Top 1 % Top 0.5 % Top 0.1 % Top 0.01 %
2001 35.86 24.51 11.06 8.17 4.26 1.79
2002 35.93 24.41 10.85 8.00 4.24 1.91
2003 35.35 23.89 10.37 7.55 3.89 1.72
2004 35.84 24.45 10.92 8.03 4.20 1.84
2005 38.42 26.82 12.80 9.73 5.54 2.78
2006 38.22 26.89 13.04 9.93 5.62 2.69
2007 39.35 27.95 13.79 10.55 6.05 2.98
2008 39.75 28.39 14.05 10.69 5.92 2.73
2009 39.93 28.06 13.25 9.90 5.26 2.26
2010 39.82 27.90 13.25 9.90 5.33 2.34
Source: PIT statistics, stock market indices (CDAX),tax flow statistics , own calculations.
Note: Share are computed according to Scenario 1b: Tax units are sorted by non-capital income and post-2008
rules are applied. Shares are including capital gains.
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